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At present Polish local bus transport (outside cities) requires radical changes. Up till now 
solutions based on market deregulation, lack of active transport authorities and a number of 
operators competing ‘on the road’ have stopped being effective – the decisive factors are 
rising costs, ever increasing market requirements and related declining incomes. 
It gives rise to the challenge of joining the existing potential of competing operators to a 
greater engagement of local authorities which will be forced to finance public service – 
expanding the transport offer, improvement of quality and subsequently also integration of 
fares, information and timetables. Another difficulty is that local governments do not possess 
competences enabling them to create public transport authorities and implement a ‘London’ 
model, which also succeeds in a number of Polish towns (Wolański, 2008).   
This paper is dedicated to an attempt to find the optimum solution to the existing problem. It 
is based on a project carried out at the turn of 2007 and 2008 at the request of Polish Chamber 
of Road Transport and Forwarding (PIGTSiS), which unites many local bus carriers, mainly 
deriving from the split of a former state-owned enterprise PKS. The expertise was obtained 
from a team consisting of: Prof. Olgierd Wyszomirski (head), Krzysztof Grzelec, Ph.D., 
Hubert Kołodziejski Ph.D., Marcin Gromadzki, Mariusz Józefowicz and Michał Wolański. 
Connecting competition and integration. 
A concept of new organizational framework for Polish local bus transport 
Due to the needs of foreign readers, the paper includes a detailed description of organisation 
and financing of local bus transport in Poland. On the other hand case studies concerning such 
countries as: Sweden, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Great Britain and the Czech 
Republic, which provide important inspirations for the postulates included in this work, have 
been omitted. Finally, the current state of work on the Public Transport Act, which might 
significantly facilitate meeting the described challenge by local governments, has been 
presented.    
THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF ORGANISING AND FINANCING LOCAL 
BUS TRANSPORT IN POLAND 
The Polish local bus transport market is in principle a deregulated market, based on the ‘on 
the road’ competition. Transport services may be offered by any operator meeting technical 
requirements resulting from detailed regulations related to bus transport and from formal and 
legal requirements related to the access to this profession. Some possibilities of regulation are 
only the effect of the need for an operator to have a licence issued by local authorities (gminas 
– communities, poviats – counties / districts or voivodships – regions) to run passenger 
transportation according to a specific timetable. 
The licence can be refused only in specific situations, according to the existing Road 
Transport Act. The most controversial of which is defined by a clause that the refusal may be 
the result of “a thread to the already existing lines”. Accepting that a traffic line is defined as 
“a transport link on a specified way between stops (…) where regular passenger transport 
takes place”, it is difficult to practically imagine a situation which might pose such a threat 
(Rudnicki, 2007). Besides, this provision arouses fears of a corruption nature (Jastrzębski, 
Gleń, 2004). 
Practice shows that existing regulations, although liberal, in numerous cases remain fictional, 
which is testified by: (Dyr, Osuch, 2005, Maksymiuk, 2006) 
• obtaining licences for servicing a line and not undertaking any transportation, which 
results in “blocking” possibilities of other carriers obtaining a licence; 
• providing services on regular lines without the required permit – as an occasional 
transport, for which the permit is not required; 
• lack of or not obeying agreed on and accepted time-tables; 
• rendering transport services without needed licences.  
 
The carrier has the right to determine prices for transport services on his own. Therefore – as 
it has been already mentioned – the carriers are competing with each other ‘on the road’, 
determining their routes, time-tables as well as fares by themselves. 
 
The Road Transport Act includes a possibility to conclude an agreement concerning paying 
the operator “a refund for the cost of a reduced fare”. Such an agreement is concluded 
between the local authority granting discounts and rights to travel free of charge (usually a 
voivodship local government settling statutory relieves) and a carrier offering services. 
However, this regulation means that the entity granting the reduction cannot choose another 
operator to whom a refund for the cost of a reduced tariff is paid than the one who has an 
appropriate agreement. There is no place for any other procedure for public procurement than 
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a contract under the free order procedure (without a tender) and the local government is 
forced to accept potentially arduous financial conditions, e.g. by a full (not a partial, 
considering price elasticity) refund of the granted reduction and no influence on full fares 
level (Jastrzębski, Gleń, 2004). 
 
Implementation of this refund is erroneously interpreted as an instrument regulating the 
market of local bus transport. In fact, firstly, local authorities have no possibilities to refuse 
repaying the refund if the operator met all the statutory requirements, among others 
independently from actual realisation of the transport offer (punctuality, number of departures 
cancelled etc.). Secondly, a refund of reductions is not the same as a subsidy to unprofitable 
line or rides. Getting a refund does not result in, which some local governments believe, each 
launched ride being profitable, therefore financing local bus transport in this way and form is 
not enough.  
 
Lack of a dominant entity in this sphere of organisation – a number of local authorities instead 
of one public transport authority in voivodship or at least poviat – allows local operators to 
easily meet all requirements to run a line, which include making the market situation analysis 
required by the law, designing time-table and tariff information and making it available to 
passengers and concluding an appropriate agreement regarding the use of bus-stops. 
 
Capital requirements are not a barrier to market access, either. The planned transport offer 
may require just one bus to execute it. The costs related to having a fleet reserve may be 
limited through outsourcing replacement transport (in case the basic vehicle is unavailable) or 
they may be totally disregarded, for although not executed rides do have negative effects 
directly for the operator in the form of reduced income and a worse image of the transport 
company, they do not bring about any other economic restrictions, e.g. contractual or 
administrative fines. The cost that also has to be incurred is purchasing fiscal equipment 
allowing the operator to apply to the market regulator for repayment of concessions in relation 
to the get the refund of reduced-fare and free tickets.   
 
The biggest competition barrier on the local market of bus transport is the access to bus 
stations (and to a lesser extent to bus stops) in towns where particular lines have their termini 
or intermediate stops at hubs. Those terminals allow interchanges not only within the 
framework of local bus but also within local and national railway routes, as well as urban 
public transport. The bus stations are usually owned by former PKS companies, rarely by 
urban local authorities. A fight for passengers against other carriers caused that PKS 
companies did not, and do not, want to enable other operators to use bus stations. Having 
access to bus stations is a serious competitive advantage and at the same time a barrier for 
development of competitive and integration processes on the market of local bus transport. 
Towns, not being responsible for local public transport functioning, do not appreciate the 
importance of convenient location and equal access of local bus operators to bus stations. 
 
Operators acting in conditions of deregulation of local road transport market, in their activities 
primarily take into consideration the need to satisfy passengers’ expectations and the wish to 
maximise profits. Economic effectiveness of each line, and even of each ride, is calculated 
separately. While valuing the level of fares, only market criteria are taken into account. The 
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operator calculates the price for his service on his own, based on the one hand on costs and on 
the other on profitability of a given line. Profitability of a line is determined by ticket prices, 
intensity of competition, passengers’ financial possibilities and passenger structure which 
conditions the level of financial compensation from public authority in relation to using 
statutory reductions. Political, social or macroeconomic criteria have a limited influence on 
individual carriers’ shaping the level of tariffs.   
 
The issues of quality management look similar, which often causes running exploited, high-
floor buses, without providing the necessary passenger information.  
 
The principles of functioning of deregulated local road transport allow achieving sufficient 
standards of service, primarily on high-demand lines. Whereas in relations to areas with small 
density of population and in unattractive for commercial operators parts of the day or week 
(e.g. late evening or holidays), the inhabitants may be deprived of the possibility to use public 
transport. As already mentioned, this phenomenon is intensified together with the currently 
observed increase of drivers’ wages and growing availability of cars which results in 
decreasing passenger flows. 
 
An essential problem of functioning of this market form is a limited possibility of creating a 
transport offer which is attractive for passengers. A relatively large number of small 
competing operators cause disintegration and significant diversity of the assortment of offered 
services. The basic negative effects of a deregulated local transport market regarding 
individual fragmentary local markets us a leak of:  
• integrated one-trip and seasonal tickets honoured by individual operators on specified 
routes or groups of routes;  
• network tickets within different local buses or integrated with urban and railway 
transport; 
• an integrated information system concerning local public transport functioning (time-
tables, tariffs); 
• coordination of timetables at terminals, allowing easy interchanges. 
 
The deregulated form of local road transport market does not exclude operators’ cooperation 
on different levels covering, for example, joint line servicing, a common tariff, a common 
information system and a joint sale of tickets in order to achieve defined effects, similar to an 
integrated transport system. Such cooperation is sometimes forced by high intensity of 
competition on certain transport routes, while on the other hand it radically reduces 
effectiveness of economic activity pursued by operators. It integrates existing offer and raises 
its attractiveness from the passengers’ point of view, as well as increases stability of 
operators’ activities on the market, by creating certain barriers to market access and limiting 
the scope and intensity of competition. It should be mentioned that integrating tariffs by 
operators may be treated as price collusion by Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection. 
 
Cooperation between operators would be facilitated if there were institutionalised forms of 
local bus transport management. Under present market as well as formal and legal 
circumstances there are no solutions enabling creating an integrated offer. However, one 
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should pay attention to an important positive role of competition processes existing on this 
market, particularly in the price-cost aspect, and to the fact that separate regional markets 
undergo gradual evolution, thus ensuring additional benefits to passengers in local bus 
transportation. 
 
As for the supply side of the market, in the 90ies of last century processes of division and 
ownership transformation of the state-owned PKS were started. These processes aimed at 
increasing economic and financial effectiveness of local bus transport, improving operators’ 
financial position, increasing the quality of provided services, and thus competitiveness of this 
kind of transport. 
 
Privatisation of PKS branches, dominant on the local bus transport market and as a rule 
covering 1 or 2 poviats, was implemented through selling the companies, contributing capital 
of smaller firms to the already existing companies, liquidation or employee leasing. The most 
important private investors are an international corporation Veolia Transport Polska (formerly 
Connex Polska), which owns 13 PKS companies, and two urban transport operators. Orbis 
Transport (Accor), which presently owns two PKS companies, is the second significant 
strategic investor. Also capital groups participating in privatisation of 2 or 3 companies are 
formed. However, it should be stressed that many PKS companies still operate as state-owned 
enterprises or the State Treasury companies.  
 
The results of the research show that the managers of non-privatised PKS companies 
unwillingly undertake activities aiming at privatisation. Majority of management in these 
companies declare for privatisation with the participation of employees and local self-
government (Dyr, Osuch, 2005). This is the official standpoint of the Car Transport 
Employers’ Union of Poland, which recognizes employee leasing as proven and best solution 
to privatisation of companies and therefore prepared a suitable project within the framework 
of the Act on Commercialisation and Privatisation (Osuch, 2007). 
 
Companies based on former branches of PKS continue to remain main operators realising 
passenger carriage in local bus transport. Their position results from the transport potential 
they own (more than 17,000 buses). 
 
Small private operators in local bus transport function within the framework of their own 
transport offer, which is subject to coordination with local operators dominant on the given 
fragmentary market. According to the estimates of the Polish Chamber of Commerce of Road 
Transport and Forwarding in 2005 in Poland some 1.5- 2 thousand private entities functioned 
within services offered by local bus transport (Szczerbaciuk, 2005). Some of them                          
exploit 1 or 2 buses; nevertheless others are quality leaders on local markets, providing 
services of a higher standard than PKS. However, this may be the result of their servicing 
solely the most profitable lines.              
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AUTHORS’ PROPOSAL OF CHANGES 
As already mentioned at the beginning, on the basis of the diagnosis of the current state and 
analyses of both foreign and national experiences in the field of competitive tendering, an 
organisational model for Polish local bus transport, based on the policy of open market with 
regulated competition, was prepared. 
 
Due to the need to guarantee a suitable standard of services, their basic scope – covered by 
public service obligation – should be provided by operators contracted to carry out transport 
tasks specified by public authorities through Regional Transport Authorities (RTAs), 
organising within the scope of one entity as many kinds of transport in the region as possible 
and being responsible for their integration, promotion and unified information. 
 
The RTAs should adopt one of the following organisational and legal forms: 
• a voivodship local government department or a budget unit; 
• a voivodship, poviat and gmina local government company or only a voivodship and 
poviat local government company; 
• a voivodship, poviat and gmina local government municipal union or only a union of 
voivodship and poviat local government, on condition that there will be legal 
possibilities of establishing such unions. 
 
Operators would be contracted under public procurement procedure (a tender). A possibility 
to employ an operator under a direct award, in accordance with The European Parliament and 
the Council of Europe Regulation (EC) No. 1370/2007 of 23rd October 2007, would be 
limited in compliance with the regulations included there. 
 
Within the framework of a tender the subject of evaluation are fares not exceeding maximum 
ticket prices set by the RTA that specify the required parameters concerning quantity and 
quality of delivered services (bus type, age, equipment etc.). In case no subsequent bidder 
submits an offer within the range of maximum prices, the authority invites further bids in 
which the expected budget subsidy to the provided services, with maximum prices set by the 
RTA, is valued. It means that entering the bid for the first time, the operator calculates the 
price level which is necessary from his point of view. In case the bid remains unsettled, the 
operator enters a further bid stating the expected budget subsidy, with maximum prices set by 
the authority, and taking into account price elasticity.  
 
The RTA would only decide about routes and the number of connections on each route 
considering different times of day, week and year and standard of the fleet, for the suggested 
model of net contracts should be tied to the possibility of operators’ independent operational 
shaping of the carriage offer. In Poland this would be a new solution, different from those 
used in urban transport systems and as a rule based on gross contracts. The most important 
reason for this diversity is the fact that in local transport planning competences are currently 
owned by operators and the local government must develop them yet. 
 
Also independent carriers who would on their own shape their offer and are granted licences 
to put this offer into practice should have a possibility to render services. The scope of 
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activities of such operators, gaining income only directly from passengers, would depend on 
quantitative and qualitative level of the RTA’s and the operators’ he employs joint offer. 
Considering specifity, determined by the area and distance of a journey, of providing 
transport services in a region one may assume that for independent operators there would 
always be a specific market niche ensuring profitability of operation. 
 
In the situation of well-planned and integrated (by tariffs and time-tables) local transport 
assisted by public means, operators’ functioning outside the basic lines sub-system is 
connected with risk, for without getting refunds on applied discounts, rights to free passage or 
budget payments, they will not be competitive. However, we should allow for the possibility 
of their performing services as a complement to the basic offer. In regions where there is no 
suitable transport policy, there is a risk of autonomously functioning operators taking over a 
significant market share. Yet this will have a favourable effect on the size of the transport 
offer, though in effect may lead to an increase of the deregulation level. Nevertheless, this is a 
better solution than the RTA, who may not be enough passenger-oriented, artificially closing 
market niches. 
 
Foreign as well as Polish experiences in urban transport point to the purposefulness of a 
regulation leading in to giving up the ‘on the road’ competition and substituting it by high 
quality demands. In such a case regulations should impose on operators’ demands concerning 
environment requirements, adjusting the fleet to the needs of disabled persons, outlining the 
tariffs and also securing appropriate supply of services in specified times of the day, peak and 
off-peak. The condition of efficiency of the discussed solutions is, on the one hand, 
introducing and enforcing stipulated penalties and on the other hand including in the contracts 
a limited operators’ influence on the size of demand due to introducing some regulations (e.g. 
integrated fares). 
 
Operators who gained access to the market should be controlled as regards their activities on 
the market, in accordance with the contract or licence. Effective control is an indispensable 
condition of proper functioning of individual markets. One of essential causes of improper 
functioning of local bus transport market is lack of suitable control over operators’ activities 
according to licences. Some operators altogether do not execute carriages on this market or 
execute them regardless of time-tables. Financial and administrative penalties should be 
imposed for not respecting provisions of contracts and licences. 
 
In the suggested solution of the issue of access to the local bus transport market there will be a 
possibility of providing services by operators of different sizes, including small ones using 
fewer than 10 busses. This will allow the companies run subsidised high quality lines, instead 
competing with them for price sensitive customers. In relation to spatially separated defined 
market segments, it will be possible to organise tenders with the view of choosing one 
operator in order to ensure his direct interaction with the client, which will allow providing a 
high quality service. 
 
Securing access to infrastructure is a condition of proper transport service on separate 
fragmentary markets. Primarily access to stops, termini and hubs in local bus transport needs 
to be solved. An appropriate solution would be for the RTA to have bus stations and bus stops 
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at his disposal. Bus stations should be owned by gminas on the area of which they are located. 
Gminas would pass on stations and stops on their area to the disposal of RTA. The access to 
the station, if it remains the property of one of the operators, should be provided for all other 
companies on non-discriminative principles. 
 
At the same time one should aim towards privatisation of bus transport companies acting as 
State Treasury companies and state-owned companies, after their prior commercialisation 
through: 
• capital privatisation; 
• setting up employee companies (employees buyout, usually combined with 
management buyout); 
• buying out companies by external entities; 
• bringing companies as a contribution in kind to another entity functioning as a 
company. 
 
An RTA should have a possibility of introducing an integrated ticket, in force on a narrow 
scale in a regulated local bus transport and on a wide scale in the whole local (urban transport 
included) and regional transport including railways. Of course, with this in force it is possible 
to keep the autonomy of urban local governments and their Public Transport Authorities in 
direct transport management. RTA’s possibilities within this range will be determined by the 
scope of his operations. An RTA having the three kinds of transport – local bus, urban and 
railways – at his disposal will have the biggest possibilities. In a situation of a PTA 
introducing an integrated ticket, this entity will be the issuer of the ticket and will divide the 
means from its sale between him and the operators, according to the mechanism of financing 
transport activities. In this way an additional source of finance will be available also for some 
carriers running self-financing lines. The use of an integrated tariff does not have to exclude 
the operators from using their own tariffs. 
 
Subject to the sole use of an integrated tariff, it is worth considering basing tender criteria, in 
case of a line not requiring a budget subsidy, on the quality of offered services as competition 
on the level of fares is no longer possible.  
 
Motivating bonuses paid due to ensuring better quality services than the ordered ones or due 
to getting high grades in consumer satisfaction research carried out among clients using 
services of certain operators might be an addition to the presented system. As another source 
of financing operators in local bus transport one may also suggest concluding quality 
partnerships aiming at revitalising a line. Nevertheless, these solutions require introducing 
appropriate changes in the public procurement law. 
 
The authors of the analysis draw attention to the fact that in order to introduce the postulated 
solutions, it is necessary to make changes in many existing Acts (including the Road 
Transport Act) as well as create a special Public Transport Act, the assumptions of which, at 
the moment of preparing this paper, were very vague.    
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CONFORMITY OF THE PRESENTED POSTULATES WITH THE 
PUBLIC TRANSPORT ACT  
Currently the Public Transport Act has been in fact elaborated and has twice undergone inter-
departmental agreements. However, it is very general in character, among others 
implementing the EC regulation no 1371/2007 and referring to all branches of public 
transport, with the exception of tourist and international transport. 
 
The Act defines the notion and obligations of a local transport authority and assigns bus 
transport to the competences of gminas, poviats or voivodships – therefore statutory 
organisers’ competence remains highly dispersed. Unfortunately, the Act does not provide for 
special preferences to create Regional Transport Authorities, although it does not exclude the 
possibility of their arising. However, still the cooperation between different levels of local 
governments may be difficult or even impossible (e.g. a legal possibility of establishing 
municipal relations between them has not been created yet) and in practice such relations are 
possible to be established only in conurbation areas, between urban local governments. 
 
The Act keeps different possibilities of operators’ procuring services to transport organisers – 
including a tender, an award of exclusive rights or a direct award in the light of EC regulation 
no 1371/2007. These agreements may include both single routes and whole networks. It also 
regulates some issues of access to bus stops and infrastructure, but the solution that access 
prices are stated directly in such an act is rather rare. 
 
The Act also allows for a possibility of operators’ providing self-financing transport not 
included under public service obligation. Nevertheless, the right to provide such transport is 
limited, among others by broadly understood not competing with operators performing 
transportation covered by public service obligation. 
 
There are no regulations allowing forcing such an operator to join the integrated tariff or 
additional rules of making such an operator accept statutory discounts (or excluding him from 
the existing system of reduced fares). 
 
Neither does the Act unify the widespread use of reductions whose scope is different in the 
case of urban transport, local buses and railway carriage, which considerably obstructs 
integration.  
 
Therefore one can state that although implementing many of the solutions suggested in the 
chapter above is possible according to the Act, it neither promotes nor forces local 
governments to undertake integrating activities or increase effectiveness of the organised 
transport through tendering.    
CONCLUSIONS 
The existing system of local transport organisation in Poland is inefficient and ineffective – 
within a few years it may lead to depriving some areas of any transport service. Voivodship 
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local governments finance a wide range of statutory reductions, however without having a 
significant influence either on the quality of offered services or on their shape (fares, 
timetables etc.). Neither there exists any supervision over the implementation of the transport 
offer stated by the carriers. 
 
The postulated system is to use the strength of almost 2000 operators active in Poland, 
allowing them both to apply for orders to render services under public service obligation in 
the system of net contracts tendered by an RTA and to perform self-financing transport 
services in the market niches they have found. 
 
RTAs, integrating different modes of transport and issuing integrated tickets as a supplement 
to tariffs used by individual operators (all or only those providing public services), or best of 
all being exclusive in character, should supervise and contract the entire transport system. 
 
Currently prepared statutory solutions bring us closer to this model but although they lead to 
covering a part of transport by public service obligation, we will still have to wait for general 
and mass integration. Own initiative of some local governments, which will still have to face 
up to many difficulties, is the hope in this instance. 
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